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Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment expressly
grants every individual the right to practice her religion freely.'
Although the words of the clause are absolute, their interpretation
is not.2 The United States Supreme Court has limited the scope of
I U.S. CONsr. amend. I. The First Amendment declares, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . . ." Id. The United States Supreme Court has sometimes
looked at the historical background of the First Amendment for guidance in interpreting the religion clauses. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITFuTIONAL LAW
§ 14-3, at 1158 (2d ed. 1988). An historical analysis of the First Amendment reveals
that three different schools of thought influenced the construction of the religion
clauses. Id. at 1158-59. The first was the evangelical view, associated with colonist
Roger Williams, that separation was largely "a vehicle for protecting churches against
the state." Id. This viewpoint, referred to as "positive toleration," recommends "imposing on the state the burden of fostering a climate conducive to all religion." Id. at
1159.
The second viewpoint, identified with Thomas Jefferson, perceived separation as
a method of "protecting the state from the church." Id. Jefferson believed that free
choice among political viewpoints could be achieved only by complete elimination of
religious influence from politics. Id.
James Madison, on the other hand, "believed that both religion and government
could best achieve their high purposes if each were left free from the other within its
respective sphere." Id. Madison felt that religious and secular interests would be
advanced by "diffusing and decentralizing power so as to assure competition among
sects rather than dominance by any one." Id.
These theories resulted in the two fundamental principles that, according to the
Supreme Court, give life to the First Amendment: "voluntarism and separatism." Id.
at 1160. Voluntarism implies that the Free Exercise Clause guarantees "freedom of
conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion in matters of belief." Id. (citations omitted). Separatism, on the other hand, reflects Madison's view that "both
religion and government function best if each remains independent of the other." Id.
at 1161.
2 See generally Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free
Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. Rzv. 309. According to Pepper, the open language of
the Free Exercise Clause offers a wide range of alternative interpretations. Id. at 310.
Pepper first noted that the term "exercise" is not limited to any specific type of action.
Id. Moreover, the term is used in conjunction with "religion," another word without
distinct boundaries. Id. Thus, Pepper recognized that the Court's free exercise jurisprudence is an attempt "to simplify[ I and isolate that which is inherently complex and
inextricably connected to the fabric of human existence." Id. at 354. Furthermore,
the subject matter of religious freedom and tolerance "remains a volatile and prominent social concern." Id. at 310. Pepper contended that religious beliefs are strongly
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free exercise by narrowing the interpretation of what type of governmental action constitutes an impermissible burden on religion
and broadening the determination of when the government can
legitimately impose such a burden.' The Court has struggled with
held by, and of particular significance to, the believer. Id. at 354. Moreover, these
beliefs cannot be substantiated or verified by any rational process "such as voting or
scientific investigation." Id.
Recognizing that constraints imposed by the Establishment Clause add further
difficulty in the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, Pepper also stated: "[Tihe
general thrusts of the two commands is in inherent conflict.... One clause tends to
proscribe preferences for religion; the other on its face incorporates such a preference." Id. at 345-46. Therefore, legislation protecting free exercise would be legislation "respecting an establishment of religion." Id.
Pepper next detailed three methods used by the Supreme Court to deal with this
conflict. Id. at 346-52. The first method involves a neutrality theory which prohibits
the "use of religious classifications 'for purposes of governmental action, whether that
action be the confirmation of rights or privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations.'" Id. at 346 (quoting PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 17-18 (1962)).
According to Pepper, the Court in United States v. Reynolds used this analysis to develop a belief-action dichotomy. Id. at 347 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S.
145, 166 (1878)).
Second, under the predominance theory, the Court would adopt one underlying
value and resolve individual conflicts in terms of serving that primary value. Id. at
348-50; see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1978) (concluding that values
underlying free exercise are "of the highest order") (quotation omitted); Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 318 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (balancing
the right to free exercise of religion against the danger of coercion, and concluding
that religious exercises in public schools would be constitutionally invalid only if there
was no equally agreeable alternative provided for those who did not wish to
participate).
According to Pepper, the third way the Supreme Court has handled the conflict
between the religion clauses is through "independence and accommodation." Pepper, supra, at 350. Under this method two distinctly different doctrinal structures
have developed. Id. First, Pepper noted, the Court would categorize free exercise as
a preferred right, and, therefore, legislation infringing on this right must serve a compelling government interest. Id. at 350-51. On the other hand, legislation involved in
Establishment Clause controversies is subject to a three part test: the legislation must
have a secular purpose; the secular purpose must be the principal or primary purpose; and the legislation must not involve excessive government entanglement. Id.
(citations omitted).
3 See generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933 (1989). Professor Lupu argued that the
determination of what constitutes a burden is a determination of "where rights under
the clause begin." Id. at 935. Lupu maintained that this determination is certain to
have a profound effect on religious liberty. Id.; see, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd.
of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that public school reading
curriculum did not sufficiently burden free exercise of students religion to trigger
protection of the First Amendment; children were only required to read the material,
not affirm the truth of what they read), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
According to Professor Lupu, Mozert stands for "the unattractive principle that
compulsory exposure to ideas from which an individual is obliged by religion to dissociate does not even implicate the [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause, much less violate it."
Lupu, supra, at 944; see also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
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the formulation of these boundaries throughout the past century.4
At first, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of burden, but merely distinguished between "belief," which the Free Exercise Clause protected, and "actions," which were unprotected.5
Rejecting this absolute distinction, the Supreme Court in the 1940s
recognized that under certain circumstances the regulation of religious activity was unwarranted. 6
U.S. 439, 451-52 (1988) (finding that although government action would have serious
adverse impact on Native American religious practices, the challenged action did not
constitute a legally cognizable burden on free exercise interests); Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 700-01 (1986) (holding that use by state agency of social security number
did not impair Roy's ability to freely exercise his religion).
In LyngJustice Brennan argued that "by defining the Native Americans' injury as
'nonconstitutional,'" the Court bestowed on the dominant Western Culture the "unilateral authority to resolve all future [land use] disputes in its favor, subject only to the
Court's toothless exhortation to be 'sensitive' to affected religions." Lyng, 485 U.S. at
473 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Professor Lupu asserted that "Lyng blocks at
the threshold all Indian free exercise claims involving tribal use of public lands for
ritual observance." Lupu, supra, at 945-46.
4 See generallyTIBE, supra note 1, § 14-2, at 1155-57. Professor Tribe observed that
this difficulty in implementing the religion clauses is due partly to the fact that the
Framers' purpose in writing the clauses "was to state an objective, not to write a statute." Id. at 1155 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). Therefore, Tribe stated that the courts have been given the job of developing guidelines to
realize the objectives of the religion clauses "without freezing them into an overly
rigid mold." Id. at 1155-56. Professor Tribe asserted that the Framers saw the religion
clauses as not only compatible but also mutually supportive. Id. at 1156. Thus, free
exercise protection of individual religious choices helps to ensure that "church and
state do not unite to create the many dangers and divisions often implicit in such an
established union." Id. at 1157. Moreover, Tribe concluded, limiting the relationship
between the church and the state through the Establishment Clause helps to ensure
that the government does not unreasonably encroach upon religious freedom. Id.
Professor Tribe articulated that despite this compatibility, "serious tension has
often surfaced between the two clauses." Id. For example, Professor Tribe noted that
to spend federal funds to employ religious chaplains for the military might violate the
Establishment Clause, "'(y] et a lonely soldier stationed at some faraway outpost could
surely complain that a government which did not provide him the opportunity for
pastoral guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his religion.'" Id.
(quoting Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). Therefore, concluded Professor Tribe, a pervasive difficulty in judicial interpretation of the religion
clauses has been the struggle "'to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms and either of which, if expanded to a
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.'" Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at
668-69).
5 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (concluding that the First Amendment entitled religious
belief to absolute protection, but actions were not protected if detrimental to social
order). Professor Lupu noted that "[iln the constitutional world defined by Reynolds,
the concept of burden was an unnecessary one." Lupu, supra note 3, at 938.
6 See, e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577-78 (1944) (invalidating license
tax on religious sale of literature, and stating that "[t]
he exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment is as
obnoxious as the imposition of a censorship or a previous restraint[ ]") (citations
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The Court did not begin, however, to analyze how much of a
burden the government could impose on religious conduct until
the 1960s, when it found that if a law purposely or effectively impeded the observance of a religious practice, the law was constitutionally invalid.7 The Court further expanded the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause by applying a strict scrutiny standard of review.' Thus, the Supreme Court recognized religious liberty as a
omitted); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943) (holding that preaching religion through hand distribution of literature was a form of religious activity
that had the same claim for constitutional protection as other First Amendment guarantees, such as freedom of the press and freedom of speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (recognizing a state's right to regulate religious conduct
that threatened public safety, but stating that such power was not unlimited).
7 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) ("If the purpose or effect of a law
is to impede the observance of one or all religions .

. .,

that law is constitutionally

invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect."). The
Braunfeld Court noted that the Sunday closing ordinance in question "simply... operate [d] so as to make the practice of [OrthodoxJewish storekeepers'] religious beliefs
more expensive." Id. at 605. The Court declared that indirect burdens were prohibited if the state could achieve its purpose by alternate means not imposing such a
burden. Id. at 607. Given the nature of the state's interest in Sunday closing laws, the
Court concluded that no less restrictive alternative was available. Id. at 607-08. See
infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Braunfeld decision; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (finding a burden on Sherbert's religious liberty which resulted from state's denial of unemployment benefits
because Sherbert's religious convictions precluded her from working on Saturday).
Sherbert held that free exercise protection involved not only those cases where the
government imposed a direct cost but also where the state withheld an economic
benefit. Id. at 403-04. In striking down a law that disqualified an employee from
receiving unemployment benefits for failing to work without good cause, the Court
noted: "[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or
assembly does not determine the free speech question. Under some circumstances,
indirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes." Id. at
499-500 & n.5 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402
(1950)).
8 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (finding that only a compelling state interest would
justify the infringement on Sherbert's religious liberty); ef. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607
(stating that a general law with the purpose of advancing secular goals was valid despite an indirect burden on religion, unless the state could accomplish this secular
goal without imposing such a burden).
Generally, under due process analysis, courts have adopted a strict scrutiny standard when a statute impinges upon some fundamental right. DAVID CRUMP ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONs-rrurioNAL LAw 517 (1989). For example, when considering the right of privacy, the Supreme Court stated: "Where certain 'fundamental
rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be
justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted). In the equal protection context, strict
scrutiny analysis is triggered by laws impinging on fundamental rights or suspect
classes (e.g., race, alienage, and nationality). CRUMP, supra, at 595, 596.
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preferred freedom deserving scrupulous protection by the courts.9
This analysis guided many of the Court's free exercise decisions
thereafter.' 0
In recent years, however, the Court has substantially narrowed
the reach of free exercise protection by instituting a stricter determination of what constitutes a legally cognizable burden on religious conduct." Specifically, the Court has focused on the effect a
religious exemption would have on governmental affairs rather
than on a specific individual's religious practices. 2 The Court has
also narrowed the scope of religious protection by lowering the
standard of review for free exercise claims."3 In so doing, the
9 See Pepper, supra note 2, at 350-51 (noting that free exercise of religion was
categorized as a preferred right, and that legislation infringing on this right had to
serve a compelling government interest).
10 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989) ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether
a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.") (citations omitted); Frazee
v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832, 835 (1989) (stating that the
Court had consistently invalidated a state's denial of unemployment compensation to
an individual who refused to work because of religious convictions because such state
regulations did not serve a compelling government interest) (citations omitted);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (holding that
state denial of benefits, subjected to strict scrutiny, must be justified by proof of compelling state interest); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (declaring
that a state must justify an infringement on religious liberty by demonstrating that the
regulation is essential to achieve an overriding state interest); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (asserting that a state must show that a regulation infringing
upon religious liberty is the least restrictive means of attaining a compelling state
interest).
11 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1986) (holding that state use of social security numbers to identify welfare recipients did not significantly burden Roy's ability
to freely exercise his religion); see also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451-52 (1988) (finding that although government action would
have serious adverse impact on religious practices, the challenged action did not constitute a legally cognizable burden on the free exercise rights of Native Americans).
12 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 ("Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by
government of its own affairs, the location of the line cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development."); Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699 ("The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.").
13 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883
(1990) (stating that "[iln recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert
test") (citations omitted). Professor Michael McConnell maintained that the compelling interest test in the free exercise jurisprudence has been a "misnomer" and that
since 1963 the Supreme Court has not applied a true compelling interest test.
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1109, 1127 (1990). Such a stringent test, argued McConnell, would allow the
government interest to outweigh a religious objection "only in the most extraordinary
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Supreme Court implicitly rejected religious freedom as a preferred
freedom by stating that a neutral law of general applicability that
incidentally burdened religious conduct was presumptively valid
and not subject to strict scrutiny analysis.14
The Court reiterated this rule in the recent case Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah.I5 The Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye Court held, however, that non-neutral legislation that
6
burdened religious conduct was subject to strict scrutiny analysis.1
Accordingly, the Court invalidated legislation that prohibited the
religious practice of animal sacrifice because the legislation was not
17
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.
In April 1987, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
(Church) leased property in Hialeah, Florida and disclosed plans
to establish a place of worship.18 Ernesto Pichardo, the president
of the Church, announced that the Church's goal in establishing
this center was to bring into the open the Santeria religion and its
rituals, which included animal sacrifice. 9 Pichardo's announcement distressed the Hialeah community, and on June 9, 1987, the
city council of Hialeah held an emergency meeting to address the
community's concerns.20 At this meeting the city council adopted
of circumstances." Id. For more information on the standard of review in free exercise cases see Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1606,
1703-40 (1987) (addressing the unsettled character of free exercise jurisprudence).
14 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 885. The Smith Court upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to two Native Americans who were fired from their jobs because they
admitted to the ritual use of peyote in Native American religious ceremonies. Id. at
890. For a more detailed discussion of Smith, see infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
15 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 2233, 2234.
18 Id. at 2223. The Church announced that it would also establish a school, a cultural center, and a museum at the site. Id.
19 Id. With the importation of slaves from Africa came the introduction of the
Santeria religion into Cuba. Id. at 2222. In Cuba, the traditional African religion
incorporated significant elements of Roman Catholicism, creating the Santeria "way
of the saints" religion. Id. Approximately 50,000 to 60,000 Santeria adherents live in
South Florida today. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.
Supp. 1467, 1470 (S.D. Fla. 1989), afftd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S.
Ct. 2217 (1993). Because of persecution in Cuba and fear of discrimination in this
country, most Santeria rituals are practiced in secret. Id. The basis of Santeria is the
formation of a deep personal relationship with the "orishas" or spirits of the Santeria
church through four principle Santeria rituals: divination, sacrifice, spirit mediumship, and initiation. 13 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 66 (Mircea Eliade ed., 1987).
Santeria worshippers believe that the orishas depend upon animal sacrifice for continued life. Id. The ritual of the sacrifice with the associated symbolism of shared food is
how the Santeria devotee shows a deepening relationship with an orisha. Id.
20 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2223. The state asserted that the
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Resolution 87-66, which recognized these concerns and subsequently approved Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated, except as
to penalty, the state's animal cruelty laws.2 '
After checking with the state attorney general to ensure that
further action did not conflict with state law,2" the city council
passed a second resolution. 23 This enactment noted the residents'
"great concern" regarding the possibility of public animal sacrifices
and affirmed the City's intention to enforce prohibitions against
such sacrifices. 24 The city council later adopted three more substantive ordinances that confronted the issue of ritual animal
sacrifice.2 5
residents were concerned for the welfare of the animals, fearing that the animals
would unnecessarily suffer due to nonprofessional slaughter procedures. Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp at 1472-73. The state also expressed residents' concerns about health hazards from improper disposal of the carcasses, noting that residents had discovered remains of animals, together with religious paraphernalia, in
public places. Id. at 1474. Finally the state argued that the Hialeah community could
be harmed by the detrimental effect that the observation of animal sacrifice could
have on a child's mental health, thereby resulting in an increase in aggressive and
violent behavior. Id. at 1475.
21 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2223. Resolution 87-66 recognized
the community concerns that certain religious practices "'are inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety'" and declared that "[t]he City reiterates its commitment to a
prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety." Id. Ordinance 87-40, therefore, subjected
to criminal punishment any person who "unnecessarily or cruelly . . . kills any
animal." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12 (West 1993)).
22 Id. Florida law prohibited Hialeah from enacting animal cruelty legislation that
conflicted with the provisions of Florida state animal cruelty laws. Id. The state law
declared that "[n]othing in this act shall be construed to prohibit, abridge, or in any
way hinder the religious freedom of any person or group." F A. STAT. ANN.
§ 828.22(3) (West 1976). The attorney general concluded that this religious exemption applied only to the religious slaughtering of animals for food. Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S.Ct. at 2223. Ritual animal sacrifice for other purposes was
not a "necessary" killing, the attorney general concluded, and thus Florida's animal
cruelty laws prohibited this conduct. Id.
23 Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S.Ct. at 2223. Resolution 87-90 noted the community
concern "regarding the possibility of public ritualistic animal sacrifices" and the city's
intention "to oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals." Id. at 2223-24.
24 Id. The resolution concluded with the declaration that "[a]ny individual or organization that seeks to practice animal sacrifice in violation of state and local law will
be prosecuted." Id. app. at 2235-36.
25 Id. at 2224. The first additional ordinance, Ordinance 87-52, defined the word
sacrifice as "to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public
or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption," and
prohibited possession of animals for the purpose of slaughter or sacrifice. Id. app. at
2236. The ordinance limited application to any person or group who "kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or
blood of the animal is to be consumed." Id. The ordinance contained an exemption
for licensed establishments that slaughtered animals specifically raised for food purposes. Id. Second, Ordinance 87-71 provided that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any per-
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Following the enactment of this legislation, the Church and
Pichardo filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 26 The
complaint alleged violations of the Church's free exercise rights
and sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary
damages.27 The Florida district court ruled in favor of the city,
finding that the Hialeah ordinances did not violate the Church's
rights under the Free Exercise Clause. 28 The court determined
that the City of Hialeah had demonstrated a compelling government interest in the control of disease,29 protection of children, °
and animal welfare. 31 The court then balanced the prohibition of
ritual animal sacrifice against these compelling interests to hold
son, persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice any animal within the corporate
limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida." Id. app. at 2237. Finally, Ordinance 87-72
defined slaughter as "the killing of animals for food" and prohibited killing outside of
districts zoned for slaughterhouses except for "small numbers of hogs and/or cattle
per week in accordance with an exemption provided by state law." Id. app. at 2238.
The city council passed all the ordinances by unanimous vote. Id. at 2224. Violations were "punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding
60 days, or both." Id.
26 Id. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1992). For more information on § 1983, see generally Harry A.
Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1 (1985).
27 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S.Ct. at 2224.
28 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1488
(1989), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993).
29 Id. at 1485. The district court noted that animal carcasses were "often left in
public places leading to an increased risk of disease." Id. The court also recognized
that the animals were obtained from unregulated sources leading to an increased
health risk. Id.
30 Id. The district court noted the strong state interest in ensuring child welfare.
Id. (citations omitted). The court determined that there was a correlation between a
child's exposure to violence and the subsequent development of aggressive behavior
by that child. Id. at 1475. Therefore, the court found that a child's presence at a
ritual animal sacrifice could have a harmful effect on the child's mental health. Id. at
1475, 1486.
31 Id. at 1486. The district court determined that courts had consistently held that
the protection of animal welfare fell within the government's police powers. Id.
(quoting C.E. America, Inc. v. Antinori, 210 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1968)). The court
noted that prior to being sacrificed the animals were held in "filthy, overcrowded
conditions" without food or water. Id. Furthermore, the court found that animals
"perceive both pain and fear during the actual sacrificial ceremony." Id.
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that the challenged ordinances did not unconstitutionally impinge
upon the free exercise of the Santeria religion." The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the ordinances were constitutional."3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 and reversed, holding
that the Hialeah ordinances impermissibly burdened the free exercise of the Santeria religious practices. 3 5 The Court found that because the city council pursued the asserted government interests
only through the regulation of the Church's religious conduct, the
ordinances had an impermissible object and were not of general
applicability.36 In so finding, the Court held that the purported
governmental interests supporting the Hialeah ordinances were
not compelling because the laws did not proscribe non-religious
conduct that would result in similar harms.3
The Supreme Court first began to explore the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds v. United States."' George Reynolds, a practicing member of the Mormon church, was convicted of
bigamy,3" a federal offense.4" The Court held that Reynolds's reliId. at 1487, 1488.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586 (11th
Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). The Supreme Court observed that the court
of appeals did not address the effect of the recent Supreme Court decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith "because the District Court employed an arguably stricter standard." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2225 (1993).
34 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992).
35 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2222.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 2234.
38 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For a discussion of Reynolds, see EDWIN B. FIRMAGE & RICH32
33

ARD C.

MANGRUM,

ZION IN THE COURTS-A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS

1830-1900 151-59 (1988). Professors Firmage and Mangrum noted that "Reynolds began as a test case in which both the federal judiciary and
the church presidency hoped to determine the constitutionality of the anti-polygamy
statute." Id. at 151. Although the decision was a defeat for the Mormon Church,
evidentiary difficulties and a short limitations period restricted the actual impact of
the statute. Id. at 159.
39 Bigamy is "[t]he criminal offense of willfully and knowingly contracting a second
marriage (or going through the form of a second marriage) while the first marriage,
to the knowledge of the offender, is still subsisting and undissolved. The state of a
man who has two wives, or of a woman who has two husbands, living at the same
time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 163 (6th ed. 1990). "Bigamy literally means a second
marriage distinguished from a third or other; while polygamy means many marriages,-implies more than two." Id. at 1159. Polygamy was first acknowledged as
part of Mormon doctrine in 1852. Edwin B. Firmage, Religion & the Law: The Mormon
Experience in the Nineteenth Century, 12 CARDoZo L. REv. 765, 771 (1991). Professor
Firmage noted that Reynolds "established that Congress had the power to punish polygamy, but the Morrill Act was a cumbersome weapon with which to do so." Id. at
775. For an excerpt of the relevant provision of the Morrill Act prohibiting polygamy
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
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gious conviction was not a valid defense for the commission of a
criminal act.41 The Court distinguished Reynolds's "beliefs," which
were entitled to absolute protection, from "actions," which could
be prohibited if the conduct violated social duties or was detrimental to good order.4 2
Over sixty years later the Court refined this belief/action distinction in Cantwell v. Connecticut.4" The trial court convicted
Newton Cantwell and his two sons under a Connecticut statute that
made it illegal to solicit for a religious cause without a license.4 4
see infra note 40. Because of this power, Firmage explained, Congress subsequently
enacted the Edmunds Act which created the offense of unlawful cohabitation (thus
releasing prosecutors from the burden of proving that a polygamous marriage existed), permitted "joinder of polygamy and cohabitation charges," and effectively
eliminated Mormons from juries in polygamy trials. Id. By 1893, after the Mormon
Church officially ended the practice of plural marriage, and most prosecutions of
plural marriage had ended, the courts had convicted 1004 Mormons for illegal cohabitation and only 31 for polygamy. Id. Professor Firmage noted that because practitioners of polygamy were, for the most part, Mormon leaders, the "conviction and
imprisonment of polygamists served to paralyze Mormon society by removing its leadership." Id.
40 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146. Reynolds was convicted under § 1 of the Morrill Act,
which states that "[e]very person having a husband or wife living, who shall marry any
other person, whether married or single, in a Territory of the United States, or other
place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, shall, except in the
cases specified in the proviso to this section, be adjudged guilty of bigamy, and...
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, and by imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years . . . ." Morrill Act, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501
(1862) (codified at Rev. Stat. § 352).
41 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
42 Id. at 164; see also G. Michael McCrossin, Note, General Laws, Neutral Principles,
and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REv. 149, 150 (1980) (stating that Reynolds was
the first time that the Court had made the belief/action distinction). The Court determined that polygamy and monogamy could not peacefully coexist in the same society. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66. The Court also noted the harmful effect polygamous
relationships had on the "pure-minded women and... innocent children" involved in
these relationships. Id. at 167-68. Finding that bigamy was subversive to social order,
the Court cited Professor Francis Lieber, a prominent intellectual, for the principle
that polygamy fostered a patriarchal form of society "which, when applied to large
communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism . . . ." Id. at 166. Professor
Lieber depicted the Mormon religion as "characterized by 'vulgarity,' 'cheating,' jugglery,' 'knavery,' 'foulness' and as bearing 'poisonous fruits.'" Carol Weisbrod &
Pamela Sheingorn, Reynolds v. United States: Nineteenth-Century Forms of Marriageand
the Status of Women, 10 CONN. L. REv. 828, 851 n.126 (1978) (citation omitted).
43 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Cantwell expanded the Free Exercise Clause by making it
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 303.
44 Id. at 300-02. The Cantwells were Jehovah's Witnesses who solicited literature
on religious subjects from house to house. Id. at 300-01. The state charged Newton
Cantwell with violating Connecticut General Statute § 6294, which stated: "No person
shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause ....
unless such cause shall have been ap-
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Reversing the conviction, the Court determined that the statute acted as a prior restraint on religion.4 5 Reaffirming Reynolds, the majority reasoned that in general, all conduct must be subject to some
regulation to protect society.4 6 The Court warned, however, that
this regulation had to be exercised without unduly infringing upon
a protected freedom.4 7 The Court then held that the Connecticut
statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the free exercise of religion because the statute gave a public official discretionary power
48
to decide whether a given cause was religious.
The Supreme Court next confronted the issue, sidestepped in
Cantwell,49 of when a burden on religious conduct was constitutional.5 ° In Braunfeld v. Brown,5" the Court considered the burden
proved by the secretary of the public welfare council." Id. at 300, 301-02 (quotation
omitted). The statute left the determination of whether a given cause was deemed
religious to this official. Id. at 302.
For more information on Jehovah's Witnesses, see R. LAURENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS AND

THE MAKING OF AMERICANS

136-40 (1986).

Professor Moore

noted that to Jehovah's Witnesses, proselytizing or seeking converts was not only an
attempt to "spread the word" but "was in part a ritual that aimed at creating shared
feelings of isolation among those called to perform a thankless task." Id. at 138-39.
45 Cantwell 310 U.S. at 306, 311. The Court cited Near v. Minnesota for the proposition that one of the First Amendment's guarantees was the prevention of prior restraints on the dissemination of information. Id. at 304 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 713 (1931)). In Near, the Court held that a statute prohibiting the publication of a newspaper that was "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" acted as a prior
restraint on publication and was an infringement of the liberty of press guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Near, 283 U.S. at 712, 713, 722-23.
46 Cantweli 310 U.S. at 304. For example, the Court noted, a general regulation
of solicitation that did not include a religious test and that did not "unreasonably
obstruct" the collection of funds would be constitutional, even if the collection was for
religious purposes. Id. at 305.
47 Id. at 304.
48 Id. at 305. The Court further observed that the statute could not be validated by
the fact that any arbitrary or capricious action by the public official was subject to
judicial review. Id. at 306. The Court declared that "[a] statute authorizing previous
restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial decision after trial
is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action." Id.
49 See McCrossin, supra note 42, at 151. McCrossin noted that Cantwell could be
read to hold that a reasonable burden arising from an otherwise valid law was constitutional. Id. McCrossin claimed, however, that the decision left unclear the meaning
of the term "reasonable" when considering a general law that had an "incidental and
unintended effect on the activity of a particular religious group." Id.
50 Id. at 152 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). For a discussion of
Braunfed, see id. at 152-55; Pepper, supra note 2, at 330-32. Professor Pepper contended that Braunfridstands for the proposition that free exercise protection "is simply an ad hocjudgment by a court as to whether the legislature behaved reasonably in
light of the importance of its goals: religious liberty does not appear to require much
in the way of detour or deference by the state." Pepper, supra note 2, at 331.
51 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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imposed by a Sunday closing law upon members of the Orthodox
Jewish faith.52 Abraham Braunfeld5 3 claimed that because his faith
required him to abstain from working on Saturday, the state's Sunday closing law imposed an impermissible burden on his free exercise of religion.5 4
In Braunfeld, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the plurality,
balanced the state's secular purpose of providing workers a day of
rest against the financial inconvenience resulting from observance
of a religious belief.55 Refusing to invalidate the generally applied
Sunday closing statute, the Court determined that the burden
upon Braunfeld's religious conduct was merely indirect.5 6 Chief
Justice Warren reasoned that a state law advancing secular goals
was presumptively valid despite any indirect burden on religion,
unless such goals could be accomplished without imposing such a

52 Id. at 600-01, 603. The Pennsylvania statute in question, the Court pointed out,
prohibited the retail sale on Sunday of certain commodities, including clothing and
home furnishings. Id. at 600 (citation omitted). For an extensive history of Sunday
closing laws, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-40 (1961); id. at 470-511
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In McGowan, decided on the same day as Braunfeld, the
Court considered the Establishment Clause claims of store clerks who contended that
Sunday closing statutes violated First Amendment guarantees respecting the establishment of religion. Id. at 422. The McGowan Court found that statutes providing for a
uniform day of rest were not violative of the Establishment Clause merely because
Sunday was of "particular significance for the dominant Christian sects." Id. at 445.
The Court declined to decide the store clerks' free exercise claims, finding that the
clerks did not have standing because they alleged only economic injury and did not
claim an infringement on their religious freedom. Id. at 429.
53 Braunfeld was joined in the suit by a number of Philadelphia retailers who were
Orthodox Jews engaged in the sale of items restricted by the law. Braunfeld, 366 U.S.
at 601.
54 Id. at 601-02. Braunfeld claimed that Sunday closing would force him to quit his
business and lose his capital investment. Id. at 601. Other Orthodox Jewish
merchants claimed that the law would force them to give up their faith or continue
business at a serious economic disadvantage. Id. at 602. The Orthodox merchants
also claimed that this regulation would hinder the Orthodox Jewish faith from gaining new adherents. Id.
55 Id. at 605-06. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the real state interest was
not ensuring that everyone rested one day a week but rather "the mere convenience
of having everyone rest on the same day." Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 606. The Chief Justice determined that the sole burden on Braunfeld's
religious beliefs was an economic one, merely making the exercise of these beliefs
more expensive. Id. at 605. For a further discussion of Sunday closing laws and cases,
see generally James A. Kushner, Toward the Central Meaning of Religious Liberty: NonSunday Sabbatariansand the Sunday Closing Cases Revisited, 35 Sw. LJ. 557 (1981). Professor Kushner noted that Sunday closing laws have an adverse effect on people who
choose to celebrate the Sabbath on some other day and concluded that in a country
dominated by Christian tradition, special care must be taken to ensure free exercise
of all religions. Id. at 558, 582 (citation omitted).
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burden.5 7 The Court rejected judicially imposed exemptions for
the Jewish merchants because of administrative problems that
might result.5 8
In dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that the involvement
of fundamental First Amendment liberties required a compelling
state interest to override the constitutional guarantee.5 9 Justice
Brennan contended that the only interest being served by a Sunday
closing statute was the convenience of having all of the state's citizens rest on the same day.6" Because the law had no exemptions
for those who observed a different day of rest, however, Justice
Brennan argued that the effect of the law would force an Orthodox
Jew to choose between his religion and trade.6 As a result, Justice
Brennan asserted that the Court had exalted administrative convenience to a high enough level that made one's choice of religion
economically disadvantageous. 6 2 Accordingly, Justice Brennan
concluded that the Sunday closing law prohibited Braunfeld from
freely practicing his religion.63
Two years later, a majority of the Court supported Justice
Brennan's compelling state interest analysis in Sherbert v. Verner.64
57 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05
(1939)).
58 Id. at 608. The ChiefJustice noted the difficulty in enforcing different closing
days for different businesses depending on the religious beliefs of the owner. Id.
Chief Justice Warren further observed that allowing some stores to remain open on
Sunday would provide those shopkeepers with an advantage over shopkeepers who
observed a Sunday Sabbath. Id. at 608-09. Finally, the Chief Justice opined that if
Sabbath observance dictated days of operation, store owners would hire employees
whose Sabbath, and presumably religion, coincided with the owner's religion. Id. at
609. This, the Chief Justice decided, was contrary to state employment practices
prohibiting religious discrimination. Id.
59 Id. at 612-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Justice posited that First Amendment freedoms "'are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger. .. .'" Id. at 612 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
60 Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 613, 614-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 616-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that of the 34
states with Sunday closing laws, 21 managed to provide exemptions for religious
groups whose beliefs mandated Saturday closing. Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbert has been called the "first and leading case in the

Supreme Court's modem free exercise jurisprudence .

. . ."

Michael W. McConnell,

The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv.
1410, 1412 (1990). For more information on Sherbert, see David B. Tillotson, Comment, Free Exercise in the 1980s: A Rollback of Protection, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 505, 513-17
(1990). Tillotson noted that Sherbert was important because it was the first time the
Supreme Court explicitly applied strict scrutiny to legislation that indirectly burdened
religious practices. Id. at 516. Thus, by using an "infringement/compelling interest/
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In Sherbert, the state of South Carolina denied unemployment compensation to Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, who lost her job for refusing to work on Saturday.6 5
Justice Brennan first determined that the denial of benefits imposed a burden on the free exercise of Sherbert's religion.6 6 The
Justice argued that a general regulation resulting in an incidental
burden on the free exercise of a person's religion could only be
justified by a compelling state interest. 67 The Court concluded,
however, that the state had failed to advance a compelling interest
to justify this burden on Sherbert's religion.6" Moreover, the Justice continued, the state did not demonstrate that there was no less
restrictive way to achieve the same ends.6 9 Indeed, the Court noted
that South Carolina expressly allowed a claimant to refuse Sunday
employment. 71 Justice Brennan then distinguished the strong state
interest of providing a uniform day of rest from the state's interest
in preventing fraudulent unemployment claims based on religious
least restrictive means test, the Court resolved the tension between government regulation and individual free exercise rights in favor of individual rights .... ." Id.
65 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-401. Prohibition of Saturday labor is a basic doctrine of
the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Id. at 399 n.1.
66 Id. at 404. The Justice noted that the statute not only denied benefits to Sherbert due to the practice of her religion, but also placed unmistakable pressure on
Sherbert to forego that practice. Id.
67 Id. at 406 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). The Justice
stated that when religious exercise is substantially infringed "[i] t is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice
.... Id.
68 Id. at 407. The Justice noted that the state had merely suggested the possibility
that fraudulent claims by unprincipled persons claiming religious objections to Saturday employment could reduce the compensation fund and hamper an employer's
ability to schedule necessary work. Id.
69 Id. The Court noted that numerous state supreme courts had allowed benefits
to people who could not find suitable employment because of a religious conviction
against Saturday employment. Id. at 407 n.7 (citations omitted); see, e.g., In re Miller,
91 S.E.2d 241, 245, 246 (N.C. 1956) (holding that a Seventh-day Adventist who refused Friday night labor was eligible for unemployment benefits because "work which
requires one to violate his moral standards is not ordinarily suitable work within the
meaning of the statute"); Swenson v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n, 65
N.W.2d 709, 710, 712 (Mich. 1954) (deciding that a Seventh-day Adventist's availability for full time employment-based on the pattern of work existing in the area at the
time benefits were sought-entitled him to unemployment compensation); Tary v.
Board of Review, 119 N.E.2d 56, 58-59 (Ohio 1954) (invalidating denial of benefits to
Seventh-day Adventist because statute ordered administrator to consider the risk to
claimant's morals in making a determination).
70 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. The Court recognized that in times of a "national
emergency," the State Commissioner of Labor allowed textile plants to operate on
Sunday. Id. In this situation, the Court noted that state law prohibited an employer
from requiring an employee, who was conscientiously opposed to working on Sunday,
to work on that day. Id. (citation omitted).
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objections, to hold that the state could not constitutionally force a
worker to abandon the religious observance of a Saturday
Sabbath.7 1
The Court later applied the Sherbert balancing test in Wisconsin
v. Yoder."' The state trial court convicted Jonas Yoder, a member of
the Old Order Amish religion, for violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law.7" Yoder claimed that this law was antithetic to the Amish religion and could severely impact the
religion's continued viability."4
The Court first determined that the Wisconsin law interfered
with the practice of a legitimate religious belief.7" The majority
71 Id. at 410. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion emphasized quantitative effects
in comparing South Carolina's unemployment statute with the Sunday closing laws at
issue in Braunfeld. Id. at 417 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart believed that
the infringement on Sherbert's religious freedom was "considerably less onerous"
than the burden on Orthodox Jews permitted in the Sunday closing cases. Id. Thus,
Justice Stewart concluded that Braunfeld should be overruled explicitly because of the
Court's inconsistent reading of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 418 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, writing in dissent, stated unequivocally that Sherbert overruled Braunfeld. Id. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan reasoned that the
secular purpose of the unemployment statute was even more clear than the Sunday
closing law upheld in Braunfeld because the unemployment statute fostered financial
integrity. Id.
72 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). See generally Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980) (examining
problems in the application of the Sherbert balancing test since the Yoder decision).
73 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207, 213. The mandatory attendance regulation provided in
pertinent part:
any person having under his control a child who is between the ages of
7 and 16 years shall cause such child to attend school regularly during
the full period and hours, religious holidays excepted, that the public or
private school in which such child should be enrolled is in session until
the end of the school term, quarter or semester of the school year in
which he becomes 16 years of age.
Id. at 207 n.2 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 118.15(1) (a) (1969)). The Court noted that the
requirement for compulsory schooling beyond the eighth grade was a comparatively
recent development in the United States's history and was probably due, at least in
part, to the enactment of child labor laws. Id. at 228.
74 Id. at 209. Yoder claimed that secondary schools instilled values very different
from the traditional Amish way of life and values. Id. at 210-11. For example, Yoder
professed that the Amish people value goodness rather than intellect, "wisdom rather
than technical knowledge," community welfare over competitiveness and worldly success, and separation from worldly society over social life with other students. Id. The
Amish parents feared that exposing children to "worldly influences" in high school
would result in Amish children leaving the faith and the ultimate collapse of their
religious order. Id. at 211, 218.
75 Id. at 218. Noting that the effect of the regulation was "not only severe, but
inescapable," the Court asserted that the regulation threatened the very existence of
the Amish community. Id. The majority also stated that to avoid criminal liability the
Amish people would have to abandon their beliefs and be assimilated into the larger
community or migrate to another, more tolerant, region. Id.
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observed that, historically, courts had zealously guarded First
Amendment religious protections. 76 The Court then declared that
only paramount government interests, which could not be
achieved by less restrictive means, would override a legitimate
claim to the free exercise of religion. 77 The Court concluded that
despite a strong commitment to further education, the state's interest did not outweigh the religious interest of the Amish.78
76 Id. at 214 (citations omitted); see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)
(stating that "in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation'") (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("If the value to society of achieving
the object of a particular regulation is demonstrably outweighed by the impediment
to which the regulation subjects those whose religious practices are curtailed by it....
the regulation cannot be sustained."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 170
(1944) (upholding a child labor law as applied to children ofJehovah's Witnesses by
balancing the interests of the children to exercise their religion against the secular
interest of the state to protect the children's welfare).
77 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (citations omitted). To support this contention, the
Court cited several cases where the decision was based on a finding of a paramount
government interest. Id. at 214-15 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07,
613-14 (1971) (invalidating state aid grants for parochial school teachers notwithstanding the legislative determination of public interest and sound educational policy
because of an "excessive entanglement between government and religion"); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 675, 678-79, 689 (1971) (upholding the granting of federal
funds to sectarian institutions because of a strong state interest in fostering the higher
education of future generations); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947)
(upholding a state statute reimbursing parents of parochial school children for bus
transportation expense by relying on the state's interest in protecting all school children from "the very real hazards of traffic").
The dissent in Yoder maintained that the majority should also have considered
the interests of the Amish children when balancing the rights of the parents with the
rights of the state. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
maintained that if an Amish child wanted to attend high school and was mature
enough to make that decision for himself, the state interest could override parental
religious objections. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also, Debra D. McVicker,
Note, The Interest of the Child in the Home Education Question: Wisconsin v. Yoder Reexamined, 18 IND. L. REv. 711, 728-29 (1985) (stating that it is not fair that a child can
be denied the quality of education mandated by the state merely on the basis of the
parent's religious beliefs). McVicker argued that the court should base any religious
exemption from compulsory attendance statutes on a "best interests of the child"
analysis. Id. at 728.
78 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 227. The state specified two goals in requiring the additional
years of formal education. Id. at 221. First, the state argued that two additional years
of schooling would help individuals become more self-reliant and better able to make
their way in the world. Id. The Court found that there was no evidence to show that
the Amish vocational training failed to provide for their children's future independence. Id. at 224. Second, the state contended that two additional years of formal
education were necessary to prepare individuals to participate effectively in the democratic process. Id. at 221. The Court determined that the Amish community had
prospered for over 200 years without the benefit of the additional two years of schooling, and that their prosperity was strong evidence of their ability to fulfill social and

1994]

NOTE

1687

Therefore, the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented Wisconsin from compelling Amish children to attend formal school until the age of sixteen.7 9
More than a decade later, in Bowen v. Roy,8 ° the Supreme
Court began the constriction of free exercise jurisprudence by narrowing the determination of what constituted a burden on the
practice of a religious belief.8 1 Steven J. Roy, an Abenaki Indian,
refused to supply the state with a social security number for his twoyear old daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, because obtaining such
82
a number conflicted with his Native American religious beliefs.
Accordingly, the state denied welfare benefits for the child.8 3 The
political responsibilities without compromising their religious freedom with compulsory education. Id. at 225.
79 Id. at 234. The Court narrowed this holding by determining that such a free
exercise claim could be made by few other groups. Id. at 234-35. The Court noted
that two factors weighing heavily in this decision were the strong interrelationship
between the Amish way of life and religious beliefs, and the adequacy of the alternative education in meeting the state's interest. Id. at 235.
80 476 U.S. 693 (1986). For a further discussion of Bowen v. Roy, see Jamie A. Cole,
Comment, A New Category of Free Exercise Claims: Protectionfor Individuals Objecting to
Governmental Actions That Impede Their Religions, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1557, 1559-83
(1987). Cole argued that "Roy represents an unjustified curtailment of free exercise
protection" and maintained that "the courts should provide protection to individuals
objecting to governmental actions that impede the ability of the individual to choose
or follow a specific religion, even when no individual action is required or prevented."
Id. at 1559.
81 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700-01. Claims brought by Native Americans have played a
large role in the Court's trend towards constricting free exercise rights. See Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451-52 (1988) (holding
that although government action would have serious adverse impact on religious
practices, the challenged action did not constitute a legally cognizable burden of the
free exercise rights of Native Americans); see also Celia Byler, Comment, Free Access in
FreeExercise?: A Choice Between MineralDevelopment and American Indian Sacred Site Preservation on Public Lands, 22 CONN. L. REv. 397, 410 (1990) (arguing that because of
fundamental cultural differences, it is not easy for non-Indians to understand the religious significance of Native American sacred sites); Lupu, supra note 3, at 944 (noting
that recent claims by American Indians have brought the burden issue to the forefront, and asserting that it appears as if the Court may be prepared "to narrow the set
of conflicts that will produce injury cognizable under the free exercise clause"). Byler
contended that is it difficult for American Indians to convey the significance of the
asserted interest and for judges to comprehend the importance of religious practices
that are unlike traditional Western religions. Byler, supra, at 413.
82 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695.
83 Id. The statute required that a state Aid For Dependent Children (AFDC) plan
.must... provide (A) that, as a condition of eligibilityunder the plan, each applicant for
or recipient of aid shall furnish to the State agency his social security account
number." Id. at 699 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (Supp. II.
1982)). The Court also noted that the statute compels that "such State agency shall
utilize such account numbers ... in the administration of such plan." Id. (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
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Court first addressed the issue of whether government use of the
child's social security number burdened Roy's free exercise of religion. 84 Declaring that the Free Exercise Clause did not give an
individual the right to dictate the government's internal workings,
Chief Justice Burger concluded that the state's use of the social
security number did not impair Roy's ability to exercise his religious beliefs.8 5
The Court next reached the question of whether the government could constitutionally require Roy to provide his daughter's
social security number in order to be eligible for benefits.8 6 Chief
Justice Burger, joined only by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,8 7
found that the government should be given wide latitude in the
enforcement of a neutral requirement for the management of welfare programs.8" The Chief Justice maintained that the government only had to show that the challenged requirement for
benefits was a reasonable way to promote a legitimate public interest.89 The ChiefJustice concluded that Congress's refusal to grant
84 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699. Roy believed that obtaining and using this number as a
unique identifier robbed his daughter of her spiritual identity and caused her to lose
control of her personal uniqueness. Id. at 696.
85 Id. at 699-701. Specifically, the Court ruled that a law which impeded an individual's religious beliefs was afforded no protection under the Free Exercise Clause if
that law merely resulted in an action by the government and did not require or prevent any action by the individual. Id. at 699. Noting that historically no free exercise
protection has ever been granted in this situation, the Court stated: "Never to our
knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual
development or that of his or her family." Id. The Court further explained that an
individual could not require the government to join in his or her religious practices,
stating that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious
beliefs of particular citizens." Id.
86 Id. at 701-12.
87 Id. at 694.
88 Id. at 707. Chief'Justice Burger asserted that "we cannot ignore the reality that
denial of such benefits by a uniformly applicable statute neutral on its face is of a
wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion or prohibition, by
threat of penal sanctions, for conduct that has religious implications." Id. at 704. But
see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963) ("It is too late in the day to doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.... [C] onditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or
deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.") (citations omitted).
89 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 707-08. A majority of the Court refused to endorse Burger's
analysis. Id. at 694. Justices Blackmun and Stevens determined that because the government already had Little Bird of the Snow's social security number, the issue was
probably moot as the government might not force Roy to resupply the number. Id. at
715 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, disagreed with Burger's analysis maintaining that "[s]uch a test has no
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a special exemption did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the government's use of social security numbers was a reasonable way to reduce fraud in government programs.9 0
The Supreme Court discarded the Sherbert compelling interest
test 9 ' in the recent case of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith. 2 Alfred Smith and Galen Black were discharged
from their jobs because they ingested peyote9 3 at a religious ceremony for sacramental purposes.9 4 The state of Oregon denied
basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of
minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides." Id. at 727
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White dissented
believing that Thomas v. Review Board and Sherbert controlled. Id. at 733 (White, J.,
dissenting) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
90 Id. at 709-10, 712. The Court noted the importance of social security numbers
in computer matching techniques used for detecting fraudulent applications. Id. On
the other hand, Justice O'Connor determined that although cross matching would
have been more difficult without social security numbers, such matching could be
done with the recipient's name, birth date, and the full name of the recipient's parents. Id. at 726 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotation
omitted). Therefore, Justice O'Connor argued: "'The government's interest in preventing Little Bird of the Snow from fraudulently receiving welfare benefits can be satisfied
without requiring a social security number for Little Bird of the Snow."' Id. at 726-27
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotation omitted).
91 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sherbert
decision.
92 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Smith decision was extremely controversial, spawning
immediate petitions for a rehearing "joined by an unusually broad-based coalition of
religious and civil liberties groups from right to left and over a hundred constitutional
law scholars . . .

."

McConnell, supra note 13, at 1111. McConnell declared that, in

light of Smith, religious exercise is no longer a preferred freedom because formal
neutrality only requires that religion be treated the same as commercial or any other
secular activity. Id. at 1153. The Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
For a detailed discussion of Smith, see James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the
Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv. 91, 112-13 (1991) (contending that after the Smith decision the Free Exercise Clause has no meaning outside the unemployment compensation context, and that in the Smith Court's view, protection of minority religions is no
longer the responsibility of the courts); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinationsof Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 53 (1991) (noting that in order to
continue the Framers' search for religious liberty, courts must be willing to weigh
competing interests and closely scrutinize government intrusions on religious
matters).
93 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. Peyote is a hallucinogen that comes from the plant
Lophophora williamsii Lemaire, and is classified as a Schedule I controlled substance. Id.
Justice Blackmun noted that the government, which created this classification, had
also created an exemption for the "use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of
the Native American Church." Id. at 912 n.5. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 21
C.F.RI § 1307.31 (1989)).
94 Id. at 874. The Oregon statute makes it unlawful for "any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained di-
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Smith and Black unemployment compensation because their discharge for the use of peyote constituted "misconduct."9 5 The
Court framed the issue as whether Oregon could include religiously motivated use of peyote within the scope of a general criminal statute prohibiting the use of that drug.9 6
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 9 7 maintained that the
Court had never allowed religious beliefs to exempt an individual
from complying with a valid regulation.9" The Justice explained
rectly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting
in the course of professional practice .... " OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1991).
95 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
96 Id. Professor McConnell claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide
this issue. McConnell, supra note 13, at 1112-13. McConnell noted that the Oregon
Supreme Court held that the criminality of the sacramental use of peyote was irrelevant in determining eligibility for unemployment benefits. Id. at 1112 (citing Smith v.
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Or. 1986), rev'd,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)). According to McConnell, the Oregon court further held that
although the state did not enforce the law against sacramental use of peyote, such an
enforcement would violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. (citing Smith, 721 P.2d at
148). Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide a question that was "entirely hypothetical and, according to the highest court of Oregon, irrelevant to the
outcome as a matter of state law." Id.
97 Four Justices agreed with Justice Scalia's analysis: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Smith, 494 U.S. at 873. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but filed a separate opinion stating that the Court should
have used the Sherbert compelling interest test. Id. at 891, 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion without concurring in the judgment. Id. at 891. Justice Blackmun filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 878-79. Justice Scalia asserted that "[wie have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id. In support of this proposition
Justice Scalia cited Minersville School District, Board of Education v. Gobitis. Id. (citing
Minersville Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)). In Gobitis, the
Supreme Court upheld the expulsion of public school children who refused to salute
the flag because of their religious convictions. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591, 600. The Gobitis Court maintained that "[t ] he mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities." Id. at 594-95. In so holding, the Court asserted
that saluting the flag was a means of instilling national unity, an underlying basis of
national security. Id. at 595.
The Supreme Court, however, expressly overruled Gobitis in a later opinion. See
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642(1943) (striking down
mandatory flag salute in public schools). Justice Jackson, writing for the majority in
Barnette, proclaimed: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein." Id. Professor McConnell asserted that Barnette was "one of the
most celebrated of all opinions under the Bill of Rights[, and that] [r]elying on Gobitis
without mentioning Barnette is like relying on Plessy v. Ferguson without mentioning
Brown v. Board of Education." McConnell, supra note 13, at 1124 (footnotes omitted).
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that a person's religious principles could not relieve that individual
from compliance with a general law that was not aimed at the advancement or restriction of a religious belief.9 9
Next, Justice Scalia distinguished prior free exercise cases such
as Yoder which seemed to hold to the contrary. 10 0 By designating
these decisions as "hybrid cases," 10 1 the Justice maintained that a
neutral, generally applicable law would only be considered an unconstitutional bar to religiously motivated conduct when the free
exercise claim was made in conjunction with another claim for
constitutional protection. 10 2 Thus, Justice Scalia submitted, Yoder
was not decided solely on a free exercise claim but also on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children. 0 3
Justice Scalia further distinguished prior cases where the
Court applied the Sherbert compelling interest test. 10 4 The Justice
determined that the only time the Court had subsequently applied
this test was in the context of unemployment compensation
99 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982);
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595). To further support this proposition, Justice Scalia relied
upon Prince v. Massachusetts, which held that the state could prosecute a mother
under child labor laws for using her children to disseminate religious literature on
the streets. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 160-61, 171 (1944)). The
Court in Prince,however, relied on the principle that "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults" and conceded that the law
in question could not be applied to adults. Id. at 168-69.
100 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (asserting that in addition to free exercise concerns, the parental right to direct their children's education is significant) (citations omitted).
101 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. See generally Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional
Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the "HybridSituation" in CurrentFreeExerciseJurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REv. 833 (1993) (analyzing the different results that are achieved
when applying the hybrid doctrine to different areas of law, such as free speech, equal
protection, or privacy claims). Fry concluded that although the effect of the hybrid
doctrine was not to protect religion, the doctrine may enhance the protection offered
in other areas of the law when coupled with a religious claim. Id. at 862.
102 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. For example,Justice Scalia noted that Cantwell v. Connecticut was not decided solely on free exercise claims but was a hybrid of free exercise in
conjunction with freedom of speech. Id. at 881 n.1 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940)). See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cantwell Justice O'Connor countered that both the Yoder and the Cantwell
Courts expressly relied on a free exercise analysis in reaching their decisions. Id. at
896 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 881. The Court relied on Pierce v. Society of Sisters for the proposition that
parents have the right to "direct the education of their children." Id. (citing Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925)).
104 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84. The Court noted that under Sherbert "governmental
actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest." Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03
(1963)). See supra notes 64-71 for a discussion of Sherbert.
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cases. 1" 5 Justice Scalia expounded that under Sherbert, the government could not refuse to extend an existing system of individual
assessment to claims of religious hardship without a compelling
reason.'1 6 Justice Scalia claimed that the Supreme Court had only
"purported" to apply the Sherbert test in non-unemployment situa07
tions and had always found the inquiry satisfied.'
Finally, Justice Scalia opined that although this nation has valued and protected religious diversity, the Court could not presume
the invalidity of any restriction on conduct simply because the restriction did not protect a paramount government interest. 0 8 Citing a "parade of horribles,"' °9 Justice Scalia asserted that applying
105 Id. (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 138-39
(1987) (holding denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment when discharge was due to religious beliefs); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 709, 720 (1981) (overruling denial of benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who
quit his job because his religious beliefs prohibited his participation in the production of munitions)).
106 Id. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). The Bowen Court
declared: "If a state creates such a mechanism [of individualized exemptions), its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent." Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708.
107 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58, 258-59,
260 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971)). In Lee, the Court
held that the free exercise rights of a member of the Old Order Amish were not
violated by government enforcement of social security taxes because it would be administratively difficult to provide religious exceptions to the tax system. Lee, 455 U.S.
at 254-55, 260-61. The Lee Court explicitly noted that "[t]he state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding
governmental interest." Id. at 257-58.
In Gillette, the Court determined that the free exercise rights of Gillette, who
objected to the Vietnam War on religious grounds, were not violated by the Military
Selective Service Act, given the government's substantial interest in procuring people
to fight in the war. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 439-440, 462-63.
Justice O'Connor countered that simply because the Court rejected free exercise
claims in these particular cases did not "call[ ] into question the applicability of First
Ameridment doctrine." Smith, 494 U.S. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). "Indeed," observed Justice O'Connor, "it is surely unusual to judge the
vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss record of the plaintiffs
who happen to come before us." Id. at 897 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As evidence
that the Court had not "declined to apply" the compelling interest test in recent cases,
Justice O'Connor cited Hernandez v. Commissionerof InternalRevenue and Hobbie. Id. at
900 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 14142); see Hernandez, 490 U.S. at
699 ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether
a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden."); Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141-42
(holding that denial of benefits must be subjected to strict scrutiny, and must be justified by proof of a compelling state interest).
108 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
109 Id. at 888-89; id. at 902 (O'Connor,J., concurring). Justice Scalia's "parade of
horribles" included compulsory military service, payment of taxes, health and safety
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the compelling interest test would lead to a flood of claims for religious exemptions.11 ° Thus, the Smith Court stated that if the burden on religious exercise was merely the incidental result of an
otherwise valid, generally applicable law, the Free Exercise Clause
was not offended."'
One of Justice Scalia's "parade of horribles" came before the
Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.'12
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 11 first concluded that the
threshold requirements for a free exercise claim had been met.1 4
Specifically, the Justice found that Santeria was a religion; 1 5 that
regulations, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, traffic laws, social welfare legislation, child labor laws, environmental protection laws, "laws providing for equality of
opportunity for the races," and animal cruelty laws. Id. at 889. It was Justice
O'Connor, referring to Justice Scalia's examples, who coined the term "parade of
horribles" in her concurrence. Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia, utilizing Justice O'Connor's "parade of horribles" language declared that it would be "horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly
balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice."
Id. at 889 n.5. This reluctance to engage in such a balancing task has been criticized
by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 92, at 103-04 (stating that
"the essence of judging is having to judge" and questioning "[w]hy should balancing
be forbidden only in the free exercise area?"); McConnell, supra note 13, at 1144
(asserting that "in most areas of constitutional law.., the majority of the Court does
not hesitate to weigh the social importance of laws against their impact on constitutional rights[,]" and that "[u]nless Smith is the harbinger of a wholesale retreat from
judicial discretion across the range of constitutional law, there should be some explanation of why the problem in this field is more acute than it is elsewhere").
110 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. But see Lupu, supra note 3, at 947 (opining that such an
argument is present in every free exercise claim because "[b]ehind every free exercise
claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will
be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants
of every stripe").
111 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. This decision has been criticized by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 92, at 109 (stating that "Smith means that a
legislative majority at any level of government-national, state, county, or city-can
impose whatever changes on minority religions, or on any religion, that it desires").
112 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).

113 ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas joined this part
of Justice Kennedy's opinion. Id. at 2221.
114 Id. at 2225-26.
115 Id. at 2225 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)

(stating
that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection")). The Thomas Court noted,
however, that "[t]he determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice is more
often than not a difficult and delicate task" and then accepted a referee's finding that
the appellant quit his job due to his religious convictions without elaborating on what
made these convictions religious. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. For more on the Court's
attempts to define religion, see George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the
ConstitutionalDefinition of "Religion", 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520-33 (1983). Professor
Freeman stated that the Supreme Court has historically said little about the interpretation of religion. Id. at 1524. Early definitions by the Court included reference to a
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animal sacrifice could reasonably be an integral part of that religion; 116 and that a sincere religious belief motivated the
sacrifice.'17
The Court then pronounced that at a minimum the Free Exercise Clause pertained when a law discriminated against religious
beliefs or regulated conduct because of the religious motivation for
the conduct. 1' 8 Justice Kennedy maintained that although a law
specifically targeting religious beliefs would never be considered
permissible,1 1 9 a neutral and generally applicable law did not have
to be justified by a compelling governmental interest.1 20 The
Court then posited that neutrality and general applicability are interconnected, and that generally the failure to fulfill one requirement may indicate that the other requirement has not been
2
satisfied.' '
22
Justice Kennedy first addressed the neutrality requirement.
The Justice maintained that if the purpose of the law was to restrict
or prohibit conduct because the conduct was religiously motivated,
"Creator." Id. (quoting Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) ("The term 'religion' has reference to one's view of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations
they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.")).
The Court later broadened this definition to include "the right to maintain theories
of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox faiths." Id. (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)); see
also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("It is no business of courts to say
that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the
protection of the First Amendment."). More recent Supreme Court decisions have
taken an even more expansive view, including beliefs based on "moral, ethical, or
religious principle." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 34243 (1970).
116 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2225-26. The Court noted that the
Santeria assertion that the ritual of animal sacrifice was a central part of their religion
could not be termed "bizarre or incredible" given the historical relationship between
animal sacrifice and religion. Id. (quoting Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment
Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2 (1989)).
117 Id. at 2226. Sincerity of religious beliefs was an issue in United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). The Ballard Court held that ajury should not make a factual
determination as to the veracity of a party's religious beliefs. Id. Justice Douglas articulated this holding as follows:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the
proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences
which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet
the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that
they can be made suspect before the law.
Id. at 86-87.
118 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
119 Id. at 2227 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)).
120 Id. at 2226 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 878-89 (1990)).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2227.
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the law was not neutral.1 23 To ascertain a law's objective, Justice
Kennedy posited, a court must initially examine the text of the
law.' 4 At a minimum, the Court asserted, a law is not neutral if it
discriminates on its face.' 25 The Court explained that a law lacked
facial neutrality if it referred to a religious ritual or practice in language that had no discernable secular interpretation. 26 Rejecting
the Church's argument that the ordinances lacked facial neutrality
because of the strong religious connotations associated with "sacrifice" and "ritual,"
the Court found that these words also had non1 7
religious uses. 2
The Court determined, however, that a facially neutral law
could still improperly restrict or prohibit religiously motivated conduct.1 28
The Free Exercise Clause, Justice Kennedy declared,
looks beyond facial discrimination and protects against government animosity which is veiled as well as overt. 12 9 The Court found
that although the words "sacrifice" and "ritual" did not force a conclusion of improper targeting, the choice of those words supported
such a conclusion. °
The Justice contended that beyond looking merely at the text
of a law, its effect could be further evidence of a discriminatory object. 3 1 Although adverse impact did not force a
determination of impermissible targeting, the Court expounded,
the design of the Hialeah ordinances was so structured as to result
123

Id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79).

124
125
126

Id.
Id.
Id.

127 Id. (citation omitted). According to Webster's Dictionary, the definition of "sacrifice" includes "to suffer loss of, give up, renounce, injure, or destroy often for an
ideal or belief or for an advantageous or beneficial end . . . to sell at a loss." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1996
(1981). The definition of "ritual" includes "any practice done or regularly repeated
in a set precise manner so as to satisfy one's sense of fitness and often felt to have a
symbolic or quasi-symbolic significance." Id. at 1961.
128 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2227.
129 Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437, 452 (1971) (stating that the Free Exercise Clause "forbids subtle departures
from neutrality")).
130 Id. A reading of the ordinances, the Court continued, compelled the finding
that their objective was the suppression of a fundamental element of the Santeria
religion. Id. at 2227. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy declared, an improper attempt
to target religious conduct was also indicated by the text of Resolution 87-66, which
expressed residents' "concern" about certain religious practices and re-affirmed the
city's commitment to deter such acts by religious groups. Id. at 2227-28. Never,
chided Justice Kennedy, was it even suggested that the ordinances were intended for
any other group but followers of the Santeria religion. Id. at 2228.

131

Id.
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in a "religious gerrymander." 13 2
Justice Kennedy further determined that the ordinances suppressed more religious conduct than absolutely necessary to
achieve the asserted government interest.1 3 3 The Court noted that

the state interests in safeguarding the public health and protecting
animal welfare could be met without an absolute interdiction
against all Santeria sacrificial practice.13 4 From this, the Court declared, it could be inferred that the restrictions sought to suppress
132 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring)). The term "religious gerrymander" was used by Justice Harlan in Walz as follows: "[T]he critical question is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a
class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be
thought to fall within the natural perimeter." Waz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy determined that through careful drafting Ordinance 87-71
prohibited Santeria sacrifice and allowed other killings that were no more necessary
or humane. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2228. Ordinance 87-71
prohibited the sacrifice of animals but excluded from its definition of "sacrifice" almost all animal slaughter except those in a religious ceremony not for the primary
purpose of food consumption. Id. This primary purpose requirement, Justice Kennedy noted, served as an exemption for Kosher slaughter. Id. Although this would
seem to involve the question of differential treatment of religions, the Court stated
that this issue did not need to be discussed. Id.
The Court next noted that Ordinance 87-52 was so narrowly drawn that it also
only prohibited animal slaughter by Santeria adherents. Id. Ordinance 87-52 prohibited the keeping of any animal to be killed in "any type of ritual" if the intent was to
use the animal for food regardless of whether the animal was ever actually consumed.
Id. Exemptions included "any licensed [food] establishment" with regard to animals
"specifically raised for food purposes." Id. at 2228. Justice Kennedy opined that this
requirement clearly seemed to target Santeria adherents who usually consume the
sacrificed animals, except after certain rituals. Id. at 2222. Again, observed Justice
Kennedy, the exemption appeared to have been included to exclude Kosher slaughter from the operation of the statute. Id.
Justice Kennedy found that the problem with Ordinance 87-40 was in its application because only killings for religious reasons were deemed "unnecessary." Id. at
2229. The Court explained that hunting and fishing for sport, "eradication of insects
and pests," euthanasia, and even the use of live rabbits for training greyhounds were
not unnecessary under the Florida statute after which the ordinance was patterned.
Id. Furthermore, because the determination of what was an unnecessary killing required an assessment of the particular justification, the Court stressed that the government could not refuse to extend an exemption to cases of religious hardship without
a compelling reason. Id. (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
Justice Kennedy concluded his assessment of the individual ordinances by finding that Ordinance 87-72, which confined the killing of animals to properly zoned
slaughter houses, but did not target religious conduct individually, was infirm by association. Id. at 2230, app. at 2238. Justice Kennedy noted that this ordinance was
enacted the same day as Ordinance 87-71 and in direct response to the Church announcement. Id. at 2230.
133 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2229.
134 Id. For example, the Court noted, to protect the city from the harms of improper disposal, a general restriction on organic garbage disposal would meet the
city's aims. Id. at 2229-30. Furthermore, if the city had concerns about the methods
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certain religious
conduct rather than effectuate the stated govern13 5

ment interest.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy maintained, a neutrality assessment could find additional support in an equal protection analysis.136 Under equal protection, the Court articulated, a
discriminatory object could be determined by the circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the policy at issue. 3 7 As evidence of
the city council's discriminatory intent, the Court pointed to the
series of events leading to the enactment of the ordinances.1 3 8 The
Justice noted that the city had never tried to regulate animal sacri-

fice before the Santeria church announced its plans.' 39 The Justice
also found that the minutes of a city council meeting convened to
discuss the opening of the Santeria Church evidenced animosity
toward the Santeria religion by Hialeah residents and city officials. 4 ° Thus, Justice Kennedy asserted, the history revealed that
the sole object of the ordinances was to target ritual animal sacriused in the ritual sacrifice, the Justice opined, the city should have regulated the
methods, not the sacrifice itself. Id. at 2230.
135 Id. at 2229. Justice Kennedy observed that "a law which visits 'gratuitous restrictions' on religious conduct, seeks not to effectuate the stated governmental interests,
but to suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation." Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520 (1961)).
136 Id. at 2230. Justice Kennedy declared that "[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis." Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 696
(Harlan,J., concurring)). OnlyJustice Stevens joined this part of Justice Kennedy's
analysis. Id. at 2221.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that no person shall be denied equal protection under the laws of any state. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In other words, the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be treated
in a like manner by the government. JOHN E. NowA ET AL., CONSTITuriONAL LAW
585, 586 (2d ed. 1983). The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the creation
of classifications within the law but it does "guarantee that those classifications will not
be based upon impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals." Id. Therefore, the mission of equal protection analysis is to ensure that the
classification is properly drawn. Id. at 587. A court will test the law both on its face
and in its application to ensure that the law meets this standard. Id.
137 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2230-31 (citing Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
138 Id. at 2231.
139 Id. The Justice found this significant in light of the city's claim that animal
sacrifice had been a problem before the Church had opened. Id.
140 Id. Justice Kennedy observed that at the council meeting members of the crowd
cheered statements by council members that were critical of Santeria practices and
interrupted the brief statement made by the Church's President with jeers. Id. For
example, the Justice noted, the audience cheered when a councilman stated that
.people were put in jail [in prerevolution Cuba] for practicing this religion." Id. The
Justice also noted that the councilman then questioned: "[I]f we could not practice
this [religion] in our homeland [Cuba], why bring it to this country?" Id. The Court
observed that other council members made similar statements. Id.
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fice by Santeria adherents.1 4 1 In sum, the Justice concluded, these
ordinances were not neutral and the district court committed clear
14 2
error by not reaching such a conclusion.
Justice Kennedy next reached the question of whether the ordinances were generally applicable. 4 Defining the precise standard for general applicability was unnecessary, Justice Kennedy
announced, because the ordinances clearly violated the minimum
1 44
standard required to safeguard First Amendment rights.
The Court declared that the ordinances were substantially underinclusive because the ordinances allowed a significant amount
of non-religious conduct that either threatened the public health
or harmed animals. 145 For example, the Court noted, the ordinances' only protection against animal cruelty was protection from
the ritual sacrifice of animals by Santeria followers.' 4 n Further141

Id.

142

Id.

Id. at 2231-32 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 879-81 (1990)). The Chief Justice and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia,
and Thomas joined this part of Justice Kennedy's opinion. Id. at 2221.
144 Id. at 2232. Stating that "the general applicability requirement has parallels in
our First Amendment jurisprudence," Justice Kennedy cited several First Amendment
decisions supporting the contention that a generally applicable law was presumptively
valid. Id. (citations omitted). See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S.Ct. 2513,
2518 (1991) (holding that a law of general applicability, which did not specifically
target the press, did not offend the First Amendment where enforcement against the
press had only an incidental effect on news gathering and reporting); University of
Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990) (noting that "'the First Amendment does not
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability'") (quoting Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972)); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (finding that "[w]hen the State imposes
a generally applicable tax, there is little cause for concern"); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 245-46 (1982) ("'There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.'") (quotation
omitted); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (holding that "there are neutral principles of law,
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing'
churches to which property is awarded").
145 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2232. Underinclusiveness has generally been used in equal protection analysis. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-4, at
1446. According to Professor Tribe: "Underinclusive classifications do not include all
who are similarly situated with respect to a rule, and thereby burden less than would
be logical to achieve the intended government end." Id. at 1447. Professor Tribe
noted that generally courts will defer to legislative judgment or classifications, even in
the case of underinclusiveness. Id.
146 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S.Ct. at 2232. Justice Kennedy noted that
fishing and hunting, extermination of rats and mice, euthanasia of "stray, neglected,
abandoned, or unwanted animals," and infliction of pain "in the interest of medical
science" were all permitted by either the city or Florida's anti-cruelty laws. Id.
143
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more, the Court maintained, the health risks from improper disposal of animal remains were the same, regardless of the group
endorsing such disposal, yet only Santeria practices were targeted
under the ordinance. 147 Additionally, the Justice contended that
the health risks from uninspected meat were only addressed in the
context of religious sacrifice.' 4 8 Thus, the Court found that each
of the ordinances pursued the asserted 14governmental
interests only
9
against religiously motivated behavior.
The Court concluded that because the Hialeah ordinances
were not neutral and generally applicable, strict scrutiny applied. 5 ' Justice Kennedy repeated that the asserted interests could
be achieved through narrowly tailored ordinances that hindered
religion to a lesser degree."5 The Justice then reiterated his finding that the City did not pursue the asserted interests with respect
to comparable non-religious conduct. 1 52 The Court determined
that when the government enacts legislation that restricts conduct
shielded by the First Amendment and does not restrict conduct
producing the same harm, the proffered interest is not compelling. 15 Therefore, Justice Kennedy reasoned, because the conduct
regulated by the ordinances was solely the protected religious conduct of Santeria adherents, the asserted interests were not compelling.1 54 Accordingly, the Court held that the ordinances violated
the Free Exercise Clause.' 5 5
147 Id. at 2233. For example, observed Justice Kennedy, the statute allowed hunters
to bring home dead animals without regulating the disposal of the carcass. Id. Furthermore, despite substantial testimony that improper disposal of garbage by restaurants raised similar concerns, restaurants were beyond the reach of the ordinances.
Id.
148 Id. Thus, declared Justice Kennedy, hunters and fishermen could consume
their catch without undergoing government inspection. Id. Likewise, the statute did
not require inspection of animals raised for home consumption. Id.
149 Id. Justice Kennedy asserted that this was the "precise evil" that the "requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent." Id.
150 Id. at 2233-34. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy in this part of the opinion. Id. at 2221. The
Court reiterated the rule announced in Smith that "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous
of scrutiny." Id. at 2233.
151 Id. at 2234.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. Justice Kennedy noted that "[a] law cannot be regarded as protecting an
interest 'of the highest order' . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited." Id. (quoting The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,
541-42 (1989) (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (quotation omitted)).
155 Id.
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Justice Scalia, writing separately, distinguished between Justice
Kennedy's analysis of the Smith rule and his own.1 56 Justice Scalia
maintained that neutrality and general applicability were not only
interrelated, but also substantially overlapped. 5 7 The Justice also
disagreed with Justice Kennedy's equal protection analogy.'5 8 Justice Scalia argued that determining a single motive for a collective
legislative body was impossible.' 5 9 Furthermore, the Justice contended that even if the motivation could be determined, it would
be immaterial. 6 °
Justice Souter, concurring in part and in the judgment, disagreed that the Smith analysis was applicable to the resolution of
this case.'
First, Justice Souter distinguished the Smith rule, and
its focus on neutral laws, from the earlier "noncontroversial princi16 2
ple" of free exercise jurisprudence involving non-neutral laws.
Justice Souter next contended that the Smith rule embraced a
specific, narrow conception of neutrality.' 6 3 Justice Souter distinguished "substantive neutrality," which requires the state to accommodate religious differences, from "formal neutrality," which
156 Id. at 2239 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment). The
Smith Court held that if the burden on the exercise of religion was merely the incidental result of a generally applicable and otherwise valid law, the Free Exercise Clause
was not offended. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 878 (1990).
157 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Neutrality, Justice Scalia claimed, concerned defects in the terms of the law, while general applicability involved defects in the design,
construction, or enforcement of the law. Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). In Edwards,Justice Scalia argued that the secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test had made such a "maze of the Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional." Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in thejudgment). Justice Scalia opined that the prime inquiry in free
exercise cases should be the law's effect rather than the legislative motives. Id. The
Justice justified this assertion by hypothetically stating that if the Hialeah City Council
had expressly attempted to promulgate a law to curtail the Santeria religion, but the
law failed to achieve this discriminatory goal, the law would be valid because it would
not effect an actual burden on free exercise. Id.
161 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
162 Id. Justice Souter stated that the "noncontroversial principle" to which he was
referring was the proposition that the Court had previously held that free exercise is
offended when a burden on religious exercise ensues from a law that is not neutral
nor generally applicable. Id. The Smith rule, Justice Souter explained, maintained
that the Free Exercise Clause is not offended if the burden on religion results from a
neutral, generally applicable law. Id.
163 Id.
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merely prohibits laws with a discriminatory purpose. 1 6 Justice Souter opined that if the Free Exercise Clause protected only against
deliberate discrimination, formal neutrality would suffice. 165 The

Justice maintained, however, that if the Free Exercise Clause protects the right to engage in religious conduct free from unwarranted governmental interference, the clause compelled
166
substantive neutrality as well as formal neutrality.
Justice Souter asserted that according to the Smith rule, formal
neutrality, in conjunction with general applicability, met the re167
quirements for constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause.
The Justice stated that because the Hialeah ordinances were
neither neutral under any definition, nor generally applicable, the

Smith rule did not apply.168 This case, the Justice contended, involved only the noncontroversial proposition that formal neutrality
and general applicability are required for free-exercise constitutionality.169 Therefore,Justice Souter observed, the Court correctly
found that
the ordinances did not reach that constitutional
1 70
standard.
164 Id. (citation omitted); see Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 999 (1990) (stating that the term
formal neutrality stands for the proposition that a "government cannot utilize religion
as a standard for action or inaction because [the Free Exercise and Establishment]
clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion
either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden") (quoting Philip B. Kurland, Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 96 (1962)). Professor
Laycock maintained that under formal neutrality, the exemption for sacramental
wine in the National Prohibition Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 1000. The author
further contended that, under formal neutrality, laws that give aid to secular schools
but not to religious schools violate the First Amendment because the exclusion of
religious schools is a classification on the basis of religion. Id. at 1001. This doctrine
is inconsistent, argued Professor Laycock, with Supreme Court decisions. Id. Professor Laycock noted that in Aguilar v. Felton the Court invalidated a program providing
funds for remedial math and English classes for low income pupils in private schools.
Id. at 1007 (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404-05, 406, 414 (1985)).
Professor Laycock argued that the term substantive neutrality stands for the proposition that "the religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which
it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance." Id. at 1001. Under this definition, exemption
for sacramental wine would be constitutional because an exemption would not encourage religion, but withholding such an exemption would severely discourage religious conduct. Id. at 1003.
165 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2242 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
166 Id.
167 Id.

168 Id.

Id.
Id. Justice Souter contended that the Court should not have reached the issue
of whether a nondiscriminatory law which burdens religious conduct violates the Free
169
170
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Justice Souter propounded that because Smith changed the
prior rule without explicitly overruling earlier cases, the result was
free exercise jurisprudence in conflict with itself.1 7 1 The concurring Justice noted that prior to Smith, the Court had addressed the
concepts of neutrality and general applicability by indicating that
1 72
the Free Exercise Clause embraced more than formal neutrality.
Therefore, the Justice continued, mere formal neutrality and general applicability did not reach the touchstone for free exercise
constitutionality. 73 The Justice further reasoned that strict scrutiny had always applied, regardless of whether the burden on religious exercise resulted from the enforcement of generally
applicable, formally neutral laws, or from laws that targeted reli1 74
gious conduct
Exercise Clause. Id. The Justice added that any discussion of this issue was dictum,
and "[t]he question whether 'there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability,' is not before the Court in this
case, and, again, suggestions on that score are dicta." Id. at 2242, 2243 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
171 Id. at 2243.
172 Id. Justice Souter noted that just a few years before the Smith decision the Court
had specifically rejected the contention that neutral, generally applicable requirements for government benefits only had to satisfy a reasonableness standard because
"'such a test ha[d] no basis in precedent.'" Id. (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)).
173 Id. The concurring Justice stated that the Court should look for a substantial
burden on religious exercise, and if one was found strict scrutiny should apply. Id.
(citations omitted).
174 Id. Justice Souter noted that "'only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion.'" Id. at 2243-44 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978) (quoting Yoder, 466 U.S. at
215)). TheJustice found that heightened scrutiny had been required in a number of
previous Court decisions. Id. at 2244 (Souter,J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (citations omitted); see Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989) ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether
a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.") (citations omitted); Frazee
v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989) (holding that state
denial of unemployment compensation was not justified by a compelling government
interest); Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141 (holding that state denial of benefits, subjected to
strict scrutiny, must be justified by proof of a compelling state interest); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (finding that "[g]overnmental interest
[in eradicating racial discrimination in education] substantially outweighs whatever
burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (declaring that a state must
justify an infringement on religious liberty by demonstrating that the regulation is
essential to achieve an overriding state interest); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,
718 (1981) (deciding that the state must show that a regulation is the least restrictive
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Justice Souter acknowledged that the Smith Court had distin1 75
guished prior case law but found the arguments unpersuasive.
First, Justice Souter rejected the "hybrid" characteristic proffered
by the Smith Court to distinguish Yoder and Cantwell1 76 Neither
Yoder nor Cantwell, the Justice declared, left any doubt that the basis
for the decision in each case was religious freedom.1 77 Next, Justice Souter repudiated the unemployment distinction offered as a

justification for the holdings in Sherbert and its progeny.1 78 Justice
Souter also disputed the Smith Court's interpretation and use of
1 79
precedent.

method of attaining some compelling state interest); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963) (stating that only a compelling state interest would justify the infringement on Sherbert's religious liberty); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940) (stating that "the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom").
175 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2244 (SouterJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
176 Id. In Smith, Justice Scalia opined that the Court only invalidated neutral, generally applicable laws when free exercise claims were asserted "in conjunction with other
constitutional protection." Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (citations omitted). This distinction, claimed Justice Souter,
was indefensible because:
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to
swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover
the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational
rights are certainly implicated in the peyote-smoking ritual [at issue in
Smith].
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S.Ct. at 2244-45 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
177 Id. at 2244 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
According to Justice Souter, the Yoder Court recognized that "fundamental claims of
religious freedom [were] at stake." Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221). Justice Souter
also observed that the language quoted in Smith from the Cantwell decision did not
come from the part of the opinion dealing with a neutral, generally applicable law,
but was from the second part of the decision which involved a common law "breachof-peace conviction for playing phonograph records." Id. at 2244 n.4.
178 Id. at 2245 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citations omitted). Justice Souter noted that the Smith Court sought to limit the free
exercise exemptions granted in these cases to situations in which the government had
in place a system of individualized exemptions. Id. (quotation omitted). Justice Souter argued that before Smith, however, the Court declined to accept that interpretation of the unemployment compensation cases. Id. (citing Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 142 n.7;
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 727-32
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting)).
179 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S.Ct.at 2245 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter opined that Smith's interpretation of
Reynolds v. United States was inconsistent with other Court decisions interpreting the
Reynolds's decision. Id. at 2245-46 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Justice noted that Minersville School
District, Board of Education. v. Gobitis, which was relied upon in Smith, was explicitly
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Justice Souter maintained that the Smith rule could be reexam-

ined consonant with the precept of stare decisis.18 0 The Justice explained that the Smith holding was not subjected to "full dress

argument,"18 1 and that established free exercise jurisprudence
would have achieved the same result.1 82 Therefore, Justice Souter
concluded, the Smith Court violated a long-standing principle of
restraint by announcing an unnecessary rule of law. 183 Justice Souter further noted that the Court could more easily reexamine recent cases because lower courts usually have not extensively relied
upon such cases.1 84 Finally, Justice Souter stressed that because
Smith created a new rule without overruling the prior rule, courts
would be faced with the question of which rule to apply, thus war85
ranting a reexamination.1
Justice Souter elaborated that the Court not only should have
looked at prior law when reexamining Smith, but also should have
considered the language of the Free Exercise Clause and its hisoverruled in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. Id. at 2246 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Thus, Justice Souter concluded that the Court
had consistently applied compelling interest analysis in demanding exemptions for
religious conduct from neutral, generally applicable laws, and that Smith did not fit
with settled law. Id. Justice Souter then reminded the Court that the compelling
interest test was applied as recently as a year before the Smith decision Id. (citing
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989) (holding state
denial of unemployment compensation not justified by a compelling government
interest)).
180 Id. at 2247 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
181 Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676-77 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Justice Souter contended that neither parties' brief in Smith addressed the issue of
whether strict scrutiny and the Free Exercise Clause was applicable. Id. Additionally,
Justice Souter argued that "[s]oundjudicial decisionmaking requires 'both a vigorous
prosecution and a vigorous defense.'" Id. (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978)).
182 Id. The Smith Court, asserted Justice Souter, should have exercised judicial restraint and not have formulated "'a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'" Id. (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (further quotation
omitted)). Justice Souter noted thatJustice O'Connor reached the same result as the
majority in Smith by applying a strict scrutiny analysis. Id.
183 Id. Because this rule of law was unnecessary and was decided without being
briefed by the parties, the Justice stated that the rule was akin to "'dicta. ..which may
be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.'" Id. (quoting
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)).
184 Id. at 2248 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Souter noted that over time a decision "may be subject to reliance in a way that
new and unexpected decisions are not," but because of the recent vintage of the
Smith decision, it may not yet be "part of the tissue of the law." Id. (citations omitted).
185 Id.
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tory. 6 The Smith Court, observed Justice Souter, did not state that
the clause's text compelled that Court's decision, but only that it
was a "permissible reading" of the clause.18 7 Justice Souter commented that arguably the pre-Smith rule was a more permissible
reading. 188
Aside from not making an emphatic statement about the Free
Exercise Clause's text, the Smith Court also failed to consider the
clause's history, according to Justice Souter.'8 9 The Justice suggested that the original purpose of the Free Exercise Clause may
have been to safeguard religious freedom by prohibiting any governmental encroachment.1 90 Justice Souter concluded that
although there were competing rules and interpretations set forth
in Smith and pre-Smith cases, the case at bar was not the case to
resolve the tension. 9 Accordingly, Justice Souter only concurred
1 92
with the majority's result.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to reaffirm his conviction that Smith was incorrectly decided.1 93
Justice Blackmun emphasized that the First
Amendment's protection extended beyond those rare times when
religion is explicitly targeted for disfavored treatment. 94 The Justice contended that the Smith decision disregarded the value of
religious liberty as an affirmative individual right and reduced the
1
Free Exercise Clause to a mere rule against discrimination.

5

Jus-

186 Id. According to Professor McConnell, one of the criticisms about Sherbert and
subsequent free exercise cases is that the Court did not look at the history of the Free
Exercise Clause to support its decision. McConnell, supra note 64, at 1413. This flaw,
according to McConnell, has left the Court's free exercise jurisprudence open to attack. Id.
187 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2248 (SouterJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)).
188 Id.

189 Id.

190 Id. at 2249 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Souter found strong evidence that "the Clause was originally understood to
preserve a right to engage in activities necessary to fulfill one's duty to one's God,
unless those activities threatened the rights of others or the serious needs of the
State." Id.
191 Id. at 2250 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 2250 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
194 Id.
195 Id. In Justice Blackmun's Smith dissent, the Justice questioned the majority's
characterization of free exercise as a "luxury" beyond the means of a well-ordered
society by stating that "I do not believe the Founders thought their dearly bought
freedom from religious persecution a 'luxury,' but an essential element of libertyand they could not have thought religious intolerance 'unavoidable,' for they drafted
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rice Blackmun insisted that whenever a state passes legislation that
burdens religiously motivated conduct, the state must justify the
burden by demonstrating that the law is the least restrictive
method of achieving a compelling state interest. 11 6 Justice Black-

mun expounded that the legislation must actually advance the
proffered compelling interest and cannot include more protected
97
conduct than is necessary to achieve the legislative goal.'
In the instant case, asserted Justice Blackmun, the Hialeah ordinances were both overinclusive and underinclusive in relation to
the purported state interests. 9 The Justice explained that the ordinances were overinclusive because the asserted government interests could be achieved without banning all Santeria sacrificial
practices. 199 Conversely, Justice Blackmun expounded, the ordinances were underinclusive because despite the city's expressed interest in preventing animal cruelty, the Hialeah ordinances were
carefully drafted to prohibit only those killings occasioned by
Santeria sacrifice.2 °°
Thus, argued Justice Blackmun, when laws specifically target
religion, as did the Hialeah ordinances, such laws automatically fail
strict scrutiny analysis under Sherbert.201 The Justice, therefore, disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a non-neutral regulation
20 2
that is not generally applicable had to be tested by strict scrutiny.
Instead, Justice Blackmun concluded that such regulations, which
discriminate against religion in this manner, would always fail strict
scrutiny. 203

Although it may have been inappropriate for Justice Scalia to
the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that intolerance." Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 908-09 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
196 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S.Ct. at 2250 (Blackmun,J., concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
197 Id. at 2250-51 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
198 Id. at 2251 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
199
200
201
202
203

Id.
Id.

Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)).
Id.

Id. Justice Blackmun noted that a harder question and one that he did not
reach would be "whether the Free Exercise Clause would require a religious exemption from a generally applicable animal welfare law that sincerely pursued the goal of
protecting animals from cruel treatment." Id. For more on animal rights and anticruelty legislation, see Tali H. Shaddow, Note, Religious Ritual Exemptions: Sacrificing
Animal Rightsfor Ideology, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1367, 1393, 1395 (1991) (noting that "all
fifty states currently have some form of criminal statute prohibiting cruelty to animals" and that an exemption for ritual slaughter of animals strongly undermines "our
moral inclination that sentient beings have a right to be free from physical abuse").
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mention the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye case in the Smith decision as an example of the "parade of horribles" that could subsequently come before the Court,2 °4 it is significant that a unanimous
Court subsequently held that the Hialeah ordinances were a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.2" 5 Furthermore, it is noteworthy
that both the district court and the court of appeals held that the
Hialeah ordinances were constitutional. 0 6 Such inconsistencies
demonstrate that not all courts have been zealous in protecting
free exercise rights, and that the Supreme Court has an obligation
to provide clear guidance to the lower courts in this area.
The guidance offered by the current majority of the Court is
the recently articulated Smith rule.20 7 This rule states that the Free
Exercise Clause is not offended when the burden on religious conduct results from a neutral, generally applicable law.20 8 Seemingly, in Smith, Justice Scalia decided that the effect the law had on
religious conduct did not matter, so long as the law was couched in

neutral, generally applicable terms. 20 9 Three years later, however,
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Justice Scalia noted that it is not
the legislative intent that the Court is concerned with, but the ef204 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89
(1990). In Smith, Justice Scalia stated that "[t]he rule respondents favor would open
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations
of almost every conceivable kind-[including] ... animal cruelty laws, see, e.g., Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp 1467 (SD Fla. 1989) ....
The First Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require this." Id. (citations omitted).
Professor McConnell found it especially troubling that the Court included this
case in its "parade of horribles" while the case was on appeal, "given that the reference might well prejudice the case in the appellate court." McConnell, supra note 13,
at 1141 n.140. Indeed, noted McConnell, the appellee's brief to the Court of Appeals
prominently quoted the Smith dictum. Id. (citation omitted).
205 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2221.
206 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467,
1487 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd, 936 F.2d 586 (lth Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
207 See, e.g., American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 941 F.2d 808, 811
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that Smith has "dramatically altered the manner in which we
must evaluate free exercise complaints") (citation omitted); Yang v. Sturner, 750 F.
Supp. 558, 558 (D.R.I. 1990) (holding that "[i]t is with deep regret that I have determined that [Smith] mandates that I recall my prior opinion"); United States v. Boyll,
774 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (D.N.M. 1991) (stating that the Supreme Court recently
"elected to abandon the compelling interest test in cases involving a 'neutral, generally applicable . . . law'") (citation omitted).
208 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990).
209 Id. In Smith Justice Scalia argued that "if prohibiting the exercise of religion...
is not the object . . . but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." Id.
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fect on religious conduct. 21 0 If a legislature intended to enact a
neutral, generally applicable law that effectively burdened religious
conduct, does a court look to the effect of the law and ignore the
intent, or does a court look to the intent of the law and ignore the
effect? The Supreme Court's guidance in this area is unclear.
The Court should return to the standard of heightened scrutiny that allows for religious exemptions as applied before the Smith
decision. Indeed, with the recent enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,2 1 I even the federal legislature has recognized

the need to restore the compelling interest test to justify restrictions on religious practices. 12 In so doing, any burden on an indi210 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Specifically, Justice Scalia asserted: "The First Amendment does not refer to the purposes for which legislators enact laws, but to the effects
of the laws enacted ..
" Id. (quotation omitted).
211 The Religious Freedom Reformation Act (RFRA) provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF
PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.- The Congress finds that -

(5)

the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests.
(b) PuRPoSES.- The purposes of this Act are (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.
139 CONG. REc. H8713-14 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993).
212 Ronald B. Flowers, Government Accommodation of Religious-Based Conscientious Objection, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 695, 731-32, 733 (1993). On November 16, 1993, President Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which requires
application of strict scrutiny review to alleged violations of the Free Exercise Clause.
Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law ProtectingReligious Practices,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993,
at A18. Mr. Steinfels noted that "even in cases where Government concerns like
health or safety do justify infringements of religious practices, the new law requires
the use of whatever means would be least restrictive to religion." Id. Professor Flowers noted that the enactment of RFRA resulted directly from the controversy caused
by the Smith opinion. Flowers, supra, at 731. For example, Professor Flowers argued
that as a result of Smith, religious-based objections to conforming to or participating
in government programs such as military service, income taxes, or jury duty will no
longer be permitted. Id. at 695, 697-708, 711-24. However, under RFRA, Flowers asserted that the government will now have to demonstrate that it has a compelling
interest in interfering with religion and that no alternative means of serving that interest can be accomplished. Id. at 733-34. Thus, concluded Professor Flowers: "Once
again, as it was prior to Smith, religious freedom will be the rule and governmental
interference in religious behavior will be the exception." Id. at 734.
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vidual's religious practices will now be weighed against the State's
justification for the denial of a religious exemption.
Such an approach would apply a more historically correct
reading of the Free Exercise Clause. 2 11 Prior to ratifying the First
Amendment, 2 14 almost every state had enacted a constitution that
defined religious liberty in terms of an individual believer's conscience and the actions that flowed therefrom.2 1 5 Moreover, during this time period, the states had granted religious exemptions
based on the needs of the individual sects.2 16 Therefore, it can be
argued that the country that ratified the Free Exercise Clause was

213 McConnell, supra note 64, at 1455. Professor McConnell noted that although
modern courts have relied upon the Jeffersonian doctrine that frowned upon the
granting of religious exemptions, the evidence indicates that Madison's more liberal
vision of religious liberty more closely reflected the popular view of the free exercise
provision that appeared in both the Bill of Rights and state constitutions. Id. According to Professor McConnell, Madison professed that his duty to the Creator was "'precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society,'
and 'therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society.'" Id. at 1453 (quotation omitted). But see Gerard V. Bradley,
Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
245, 307 (1991) (contending that "any serious account of constitutional construction
holds no place for the conduct exemption"); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional
Right of Religious Exemption: An HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915, 916
(1992) (arguing that in the late 18th century, Americans more likely believed that
"the Free Exercise Clause did not provide a constitutional right of religious exemption from civil laws").
214 On September 25, 1789, Congress submitted the Bill of Rights to the states for
ratification, and by December 15, 1791, the required number of states had ratified
them. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 146
(1988).
215 McConnell, supra note 64, at 1455, 1458-59. A typical example was New York's
1777 Constitution which provided:
[T]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this state, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of
conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts
of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this State.
Id. at 1456.
216 Id. at 1468. Exemptions were created for Quakers who refused to take oaths
and sects that refused to bear arms. Id. at 1467-68. McConnell noted that "[tihe language as well as the substance of this policy is particularly significant, since it recognizes the superior claim of religious 'conscience' over civil obligation." Id. at 1469.
Exemptions were also granted for religious sects "conscientiously opposed to compelled tithes," for marriage ceremony requirements for Jewish citizens "who may be
joined in marriage, according to their own usages and rites," and for Quakers who
refused to take off their hats in court. Id. at 1469, 1471-72. McConnell noted that
William Penn's arrest for failure to remove his hat was discussed during the debate
over the Bill of Rights in the First Congress. Id. at 1472 & n.320.
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acutely sensitive to the issues surrounding religious liberty and the
need for religious exemptions for certain individual sects.
The United States is home to many diverse religions and cultures. This rich diversity should be cultivated and protected by the
courts, not left to the mercy of majority rule. The courts must, at a
minimum, ensure that a legislature cannot explicitly target specific
religious practices, such as the Santeria ritual of animal sacrifice.
Beyond that, however, the courts must protect the practices of minority religions from seemingly neutral laws. It is not enough for a
court to rely upon the solicitude of the legislature because those
who engage in religious rituals not widely practiced may, unfortunately, be disadvantaged." 7 Rather, judicially enforceable exemptions must ensure that nonconventional beliefs will receive the
same protection afforded to popular, mainstream religions.
Finally, religion exists as much through conduct as through
belief. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment fully protects freedom of belief or conscience. 2 18 Thus, unless some minority religious conduct offensive to the majority is protected by the
First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause is tautological and lacking in practical content.
Diane Schulze

217 Justice Jackson, in overruling Minersville School District, Board of Education v. Gobitis, wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
218 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1138. The Free Speech Clause provides: "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Professor McConnell noted that contrary to Smith, "exceptions
from generally applicable laws are an established part of the protections for free
speech and press under the First Amendment." Id.

